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INTRODUCTION

The recent Supreme Court case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
sparked one of the most controversial legal debates of the
2014 term—whether for-profit, nonreligious corporations could
bring a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2
that would exempt them from the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive mandate, 3 allowing them to refuse to provide certain
forms of contraception to their female employees. When the
Supreme Court ruled that these corporations could refuse, 4
advocates for reproductive freedom called it disastrous, while their
opponents hailed it as a victory for religious freedom. 5
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 passed in 1993 and
revised in 2000 alongside passage of the Religious Land Use and
Inc., 1

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).
45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155–156 (2014).
See also Binyamin Appelbaum, They’re Not Like You and Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2014, § MM
(Magazine), at 14; Eliana Dockterman, 5 Things Women Need to Know About the Hobby
Lobby Ruling, TIME (July 1, 2014), http://time.com/2941323/supreme-court-contraceptionruling-hobby-lobby; Dr. Robert Jeffress, Opinion, Hobby Lobby Ruling: Why Supreme Court
Got it Right, FOX NEWS (June 30, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/06/30/
hobby-lobby-ruling-why-supreme-court-got-it-right.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–200bb-4.
1
2
3
4
5
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Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 7 allows parties whose
exercise of religion is substantially burdened by federal law to claim
exemption from those laws. Congress asserted that RFRA was
intended to provide very broad protection of religious liberty.8
Several states have also passed their own versions of RFRA to
provide religious exemptions to state law. 9 However, broad
religious freedom can be dangerous when it insulates political
dissenters from antidiscrimination laws. When the corporations in
Hobby Lobby denied certain contraceptives to their female
employees based on their religious beliefs, 10 the result was that
women would have to pay for contraception out-of-pocket, unless
Congress enacted new legislation to cover these costs. 11
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of RFRA as applied to
“closely held, for-profit corporations” has the potential to provide
similar sweeping exemptions to neutral, generally applicable laws
for businesses that object on religious grounds. While the current
cultural and political atmosphere is familiar with the conflicts
between religion and sexual liberty (including reproductive rights
and LGBT rights), the Hobby Lobby case also has unsettling
implications for anyone who might face discrimination from an
employer, even if federal or state laws forbid it. Despite the
majority’s assertion that race discrimination, disguised as religious
belief, would not be permitted under RFRA, the Court’s reasoning
granting a religious exemption from the contraception mandate
may permit such claims. This Note will consider these very real
implications.
This Note argues that an employer who wishes to discriminate
in hiring based on race—despite contrary federal law 12—can easily
state a claim under the federal or a state RFRA. The plaintiff’s prima
facie case will be satisfied if its beliefs are sincere, religiously
motivated, and substantially burdened by antidiscrimination laws.13
This Note also argues that even if the government has a compelling
interest in preventing discrimination against employees, in light of
§ 2000cc–2000cc-5.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760–61.
Marci A. Hamilton, Here is What is Happening in Your State, RFRA PERILS,
http://www.rfraperils.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
10 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2755.
11 While the majority in Hobby Lobby stated that the government could choose to pay for
the employee’s contraception as an alternative to burdening the corporation’s exercise of
religion, the Court only held that the contraceptive mandate was unconstitutional as applied
to the companies; it did not mandate that the coverage be provided by the government. Id.
at 2781–82.
12 See § 2000e–2000e-17.
13 § 2000bb-1; accord Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
7
8
9
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the Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby, the RFRA claimants will still be
granted an exemption.
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will discuss the
prevalence of white separatist beliefs in the United States and their
ties to religious belief, demonstrating the realistic possibility of
white separatist business owners as RFRA claimants. Part II will
detail the Court’s most recent interpretation of RFRA in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, and the framework the Court provided for analyzing
future RFRA claims involving discrimination by for-profit
corporations. Part III will provide an analysis of the likelihood that
white separatists’ claims for an exemption to federal
antidiscrimination laws would succeed under RFRA and Hobby
Lobby. In Part IV, this Note will propose an amendment to state
RFRAs that would prohibit exemptions that discriminate against
employees in violation of state antidiscrimination laws. Such an
amendment would be a first step in preventing further harm to
employees on the basis of religion, and an important
acknowledgment of the damage that limitless religious liberty can
do.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF WHITE SEPARATISM AND WHITE NATIONALISM IN
THE UNITED STATES

White separatists, also referred to as white nationalists,
espouse the belief that nations should be racially homogenous. 14 In
the United States, for instance, white separatists assert that America
was founded on, and should be guided by, a white racial identity.15
The essence of white separatism in America is based on the belief
that America is a white country, and gains its values, traditions, and
culture from its European heritage; therefore, “multiculturalism,
immigration and racial diversity fundamentally threaten America’s
future.” 16 There are many organizations currently in existence in
the United States that express white supremacist and white
14 Daniel Levitas, The White Nationalist Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/white-nationalist/the-whitenationalist-movement
[http://web.archive.org/web/20150304103937/https://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/white-nationalist/the-whitenationalist-movement].
15 Id. It bears noting that there are also black separatist and black supremacist groups,
often based on pieces of various religions, who similarly oppose desegregation and
association between different races. ARTHUR GOLDWAG, THE NEW HATE: A HISTORY OF FEAR AND
LOATHING ON THE POPULIST RIGHT 298–303 (2012).
16 Levitas, supra note 14. See generally BETTY A. DOBRATZ & STEPHANIE L. SHANKS-MEILE,
“WHITE POWER, WHITE PRIDE!” THE WHITE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
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nationalist views. 17 These labels are umbrella terms that encompass
a wide range of groups 18 that believe not only in the need for
national separation of races, but also in white superiority—
including the Ku Klux Klan, 19 neo-Confederates, 20 neo-Nazis,21
racist skinheads, 22 and Christian Identity. 23 Alternatively, many
white separatist groups do not openly espouse white supremacist
views; rather, they base their rhetoric in claims of love for their own
race, as opposed to hatred of others. 24 However, while the
methodologies employed by these groups in expressing their views
may be different, 25 ranging from militant to academic, they share
the belief that America should not be racially diverse, and that
association between races is wrong. 26

17 Some white separatists and their organizations have tried to rebrand white
separatism as something distinct and separate from white supremacism. DOBRATZ & SHANKSMEILE, supra note 16, at 97. However, white separatists who believe in a white nation might
believe in it because they believe it is natural for races to be grouped together, or because
they believe whites are the superior race. Id. at 91. In this Note, when the term “white
separatist” is used, it encompasses all variations of these beliefs, which share at their core
that government-mandated desegregation and any law that promotes “racial mixing” is
wrong.
18 Id. at 34 (“Memberships in these groups overlap considerably, and some prominent
figures have been involved in some groups and then have moved on to others or created
their own groups.”).
19 David Chalmers, The Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2010), http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan/the-ku-kluxklan-0.
20 Euan Hague, The Neo-Confederate Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/neo-confederate/the-neoconfederate-movement
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150731165933/http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/neo-confederate/the-neoconfederate-movement].
21 Frederick J. Simonelli, The Neo-Nazi Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/neo-nazi/the-neo-nazimovement [https://web.archive.org/web/20150325070139/http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/neo-nazi/the-neo-nazi-movement].
22 Randy Blazak, The Racist Skinhead Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/racist-skinhead/racistskinheads
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150420052717/http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/racist-skinhead/racist-skinheads].
23 Christian Identity Movement Spreads Race-Hate, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Mar. 15, 1998),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/1998/christian-identitymovement-spreads-race-hate.
24 MATTIAS GARDELL, GODS OF THE BLOOD: THE PAGAN REVIVAL AND WHITE SEPARATISM 69
(2003) (“[W]hite racists . . . adopt an underdog position. In the mental universe of Aryan
revolutionaries, whites are the bottom rung of society . . . . [A]n oppressed minority,
systematically reduced to second-rate citizens.”); DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at
156 (“Parts of the movement have tried to redefine their public image so they would be
perceived as working for the best interests of white civilization.”).
25 White Nationalist, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/white-nationalist (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (“These groups
range from those that use racial slurs and issue calls for violence to others that present
themselves as serious, non-violent organizations and employ the language of academia.”).
26 Id.
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The separatist belief that America was founded as an all-white
nation and should be governed as such is inextricably tied to a
central belief that America was founded as, and should remain, a
Christian country. 27 The Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC),
currently the largest and most prominent separatist group in
America, 28 puts its Christian faith first in its Statement of
Principles. 29 While this first Principle makes no overt reference to
race, the separatist claim to a homogenous culture in America is
echoed in its second Principle, which asserts European culture as
the supreme culture of America. 30 The CCC views an ideal America
as one that practices solely Christian traditions, necessarily tied to
white racial tradition. These two Principles together shape its ideal
view of a homogenous racial and religious country. 31
The link between religion and white separatism has even been
demonstrated in United States jurisprudence. In Loving v. Virginia, 32
a black woman and white man were prosecuted under a Virginia
law banning interracial marriages. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held all bans on interracial marriage
unconstitutional, as their only purpose was illegitimate—namely
“to maintain White Supremacy.” 33 As evidence, the Supreme Court
quoted the ruling of the trial judge, which stated:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix. 34

27 Council of Conservative Citizens, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-files/groups/council-of-conservative-citizens (last visited Feb. 26,
2016) (quoting the organization’s website from 2001, stating that “God is the author of
racism”).
28 White Nationalist, supra note 25. The Council of Conservative Citizens is a modern
version of the White Citizen’s Councils that strongly opposed integration. DOBRATZ &
SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 42.
29 Statement of Principles, COUNCIL OF CONSERVATIVE CITIZENS, http://conservativeheadlines.com/introduction/statement-of-principles (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“We
believe that the United States of America is a Christian country, that its people are a
Christian people, and that its government and public leaders at all levels must reflect
Christian beliefs and values. We therefore oppose all efforts to deny or weaken the Christian
heritage of the United States . . . .”).
30 Id. (“We believe that the United States derives from and is an integral part of
European civilization and the European people and that the American people and
government should remain European in their composition and character.”).
31 Id.
32 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
33 Id. at 11.
34 Id. at 3.
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Additionally, in some branches of white separatism, their
justification for the need for racial segregation comes from a
revisionist interpretation of Christian texts. 35 Christian Identity, a
white separatist group formed in the 1980s, promotes the theory
that Christian mythology only referred to the white race. 36
Similarly, the neo-Confederate movement argues that racial
hierarchies are ordained by God and that racism is not mentioned
as a sinful act in the Bible; therefore, it is unproblematic. 37 More
recently, there have been various white separatist groups
identifying with non-monotheistic religions, including Wicca and
Norse mythology. 38
White separatism is not merely a fringe theory of the radical
far right in current American culture. 39 Participants in these groups
do not merely come from certain states, family backgrounds, or
economic classes. 40 According to the Southern Poverty Law Center,
as of the end of 2015 there were 115 active chapters of identified
white separatist groups in the United States. 41 These groups span
the entire country, including thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia. 42 The CCC, the most widespread group, has twenty-three
active chapters. 43
One of the central beliefs of white separatist groups is that the
federal government in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
unfairly imposed, and continues to impose, a forced acceptance of

See, e.g., Christian Identity Movement Spreads Race-Hate, supra note 23.
GARDELL, supra note 24, at 119 (stating that God created the races separately, and the
story in the book of Genesis about the creation of Adam told only the story of the creation of
the white race); Christian Identity Movement Spreads Race-Hate, supra note 23. These beliefs
have been incorporated into many different types of white separatist groups as religious
justification for their beliefs; DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 73–74 (“[T]he
‘novel religious character’ of much of the current movement is rooted in the ‘Christian
Identity’ religious position . . . [that is] the ‘uniting force among many white supremacist
groups.’”). See also MICHAEL BARKUN, RELIGION AND THE RACIST RIGHT: THE ORIGINS OF THE
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY MOVEMENT 103–19 (1994).
37 Hague, supra note 20.
38 See generally GARDELL, supra note 24.
39 Levitas, supra note 14. In 2013, the Southern Poverty Law Center counted about
50,000 Christian Identity adherents, 163 chapters of the Ku Klux Klan, and forty-seven
chapters of the CCC or the American Freedom Party. Mark Potok, The Year in Hate and
Extremism, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/
intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2014/spring/The-Year-in-Hate-and-Extremism.
40 GARDELL, supra note 24, at 328–34.
41 Active White Nationalist Groups, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (March 2, 2015), http://
www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/white-nationalist/
active_hate_groups. New York currently has the most chapters of various white nationalist
organizations, at nine. Id. Mississippi is second with eight. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. (showing four chapters in Alabama and Mississippi, two in Tennessee, Missouri,
and New York, and one in Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C.).
35
36
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racial diversity in America that threatens the future of their ideal
all-white culture. 44 The movement’s revival was largely in response
to the advancement of civil rights for racial minorities in the United
States, including desegregation and the Civil Rights Act. 45 The CCC is
a new incarnation of White Citizens Councils that opposed
desegregation and increased civil rights for minorities, 46 with their
Second Principle specifically condemning legal doctrines of the civil
rights era as a threat to America’s white heritage. 47 Suspicion of the
federal government and disdain for mid-twentieth-century civil
rights legislation is a unifying factor among many different
branches of white separatism, including the CCC, Christian Identity
branches, 48 and the Survivalist movement. 49
Affirmative action laws and Title VII, laws created by the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 50 are favorite targets for white separatist groups to
demonstrate the federal government’s “wrongful” attempts to
destroy the superior racial influence of whites. 51 The CCC also

Levitas, supra note 14.
Id. One of the most influential founders of Christian Identity, Wesley Swift, was quoted
as saying, “if you believe the Bible, you are going to be a segregationist.” DOBRATZ & SHANKSMEILE, supra note 16, at 75. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile also note that “[m]ajor racial
concerns of the white separatists include the perceived threats from intermarriage . . . and
the loss of jobs to minorities.” Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
46 Levitas, supra note 14. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile argue that the influence of white
separatist organizations “was limited until the civil rights movement grew in strength.”
DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 42. After the Supreme Court ruled to desegregate
public schools in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), “White Citizens
Councils were formed and the Klans grew as well.” DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16,
at 42. These Councils “[o]rganiz[ed] the ‘better element’ of ‘decent’ and ‘solid’ southern
racists, [and] the movement spread rapidly . . . . [A]imed at overturning the Brown decision
and defending . . . racial segregation.” GARDELL, supra note 24, at 46.
47 Statement of Principles, supra note 29 (“We also oppose all efforts to mix the races of
mankind, to promote non-white races over the European-American people through socalled ‘affirmative action’ and similar measures, to destroy or denigrate the EuropeanAmerican heritage, including the heritage of the Southern people, and to force the
integration of the races.”).
48 BARKUN, supra note 36, at 200 (”Christian Identity . . . campaigns to bring the
American legal system into conformity with laws spelled out in the Bible and to garner
support for political candidates whose positions are deemed compatible with Identity
views . . . [and] develop[s] local political groups as an expression of the radical right’s
frequently expressed view that only local political institutions are legitimate.”).
49 See generally JAMES COATES, ARMED AND DANGEROUS: THE RISE OF THE SURVIVALIST RIGHT
(3d ed. 1995).
50 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2012).
51 See, e.g., Lawrence Auster, Why the 1964 Civil Rights Act Has Been Terrible For
America!, COUNCIL OF CONSERVATIVE CITIZENS (May 26, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://
www.conservative-headlines.com/2010/05/why-the-1964-civil-rights-act-has-beenterrible-for-america; Platform, THE AM. FREEDOM PARTY, http://american3rdposition.com/
?page_id=9184 (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (advocating to “[r]eturn to Americans their
traditional right of freedom of association, including freedom in racial matters, along with
the abolishment of all forms of government- and corporate-mandated racial discrimination
and racial preferences, such as affirmative action, quotas, and all forms of ‘sensitivity
44
45
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asserts that the federal government has overstepped its
constitutional boundaries by passing “hate crime” laws, promoting
“sensitivity training” in businesses and schools, and forcing the
“radical indoctrination” of children in public schools through
“‘Afrocentric’ curricula.” 52 Generally, any legislation that allows or
encourages diversity or threatens entrenched white racial privilege
is of particular offense to white separatists. 53
A renewed focus on white separatism occurred in the late
1990s, when numerous politicians were revealed to have ties to
influential separatist groups. 54 The CCC’s website boasts that they
are the “[o]nly group advocating for ‘white rights’ that attracts
elected figures as speakers.” 55 Recently, House Majority Whip Steve
Scalise 56 acknowledged speaking to the European-American Unity
and Rights Organization (EURO), 57 a prominent white separatist
group founded by former KKK leader David Duke. 58 The president
of the CCC, Earl Holt III, contributed several thousand dollars to
early 2016 Republican presidential candidates. 59 In light of the
Hobby Lobby ruling, politically active groups such as the CCC—with
strong religious convictions against civil rights laws—are likely to
seek religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws using the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

training’”). See also DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 232–37 (quoting David Duke,
founder of the White Youth Alliance and the National Association for the Advancement of
White People (NAAWP), who believed that affirmative action promoted an atmosphere of
resentment and hatred toward whites).
52 Statement of Principles, supra note 29.
53 DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 150 (“The movement criticizes the U.S.
government for a number of its policies, including affirmative action that denies jobs to
white men, gun control legislation that takes away one’s ability and right to protect oneself,
the allowance of illegal immigrants to enter and stay in the United States, the legalization of
abortion for white women, and the placement of federal guards at abortion clinics where
white genocide is being practiced . . . .”).
54 Levitas, supra note 14.
55 More Info, COUNCIL OF CONSERVATIVE CITIZENS, http://conservative-headlines.com/
more-info (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). However, white separatists generally do not endorse
the Republican party. GARDELL, supra note 24, at 67 (“[R]evolutionary ideologues typically
denounce the conservative right wing as part of the problem, blinded by their patriotism to
the ‘fact’ that the administration of the United States is a primary enemy of the white race.”).
56 MAJORITY WHIP STEVE SCALISE, http://www.majoritywhip.gov (last visited Feb. 26,
2016).
57 Robert Costa & Ed O’Keefe, House Majority Whip Scalise Confirms He Spoke to White
Supremacists in 2002, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/house-majority-whip-scalise-confirms-he-spoke-to-white-nationalists-in-2002/
2014/12/29/7f80dc14-8fa3-11e4-a900-9960214d4cd7_story.html.
58 EURO, S. POVERTY L. CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/
groups/euro (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
59 Michael Wines & Lizette Alvarez, Council of Conservative Citizens Promotes White
Primacy, and G.O.P. Ties, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
23/us/politics/views-on-race-and-gop-ties-define-group-council-of-conservativecitizens.html.
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II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND HOBBY LOBBY

The Free Exercise Clause and Passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was a legislative
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 60 which held
that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit religious claimants to
claim exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws. 61 In
Smith, claimants Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their
jobs at a drug rehabilitation center because they had used peyote
during a ceremony at the Native American Church. 62 They were
then denied unemployment benefits because Oregon law stated that
employees fired for misconduct were not entitled to benefits. 63
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of peyote
and denial of unemployment benefits. 64 In doing so, it rejected the
claimants’ argument that neutral, generally applicable laws should
be subject to a “compelling interest” test. 65 The Court also
distinguished Sherbert v. Verner, pointing out that the religious
claimant’s desired exemption in that case (to not work on Saturday,
Seventh-Day Adventists’ Sabbath) was not illegal, unlike the use of
peyote. 66
After the Smith ruling, backlash from religious groups spurred
Congress to pass RFRA—which condemned Smith for not applying a
compelling interest standard 67—creating a new path for religious
claimants to seek exemption from neutral, generally applicable
laws. RFRA requires that claimants make a prima facie case that a
60 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015).
61 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
62 Id. at 874.
63 Id. The Oregon Department of Human Resources argued that because the use of
peyote was a crime, the denial of benefits was permissible. Id. at 875. The religious
claimants, citing the case Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), argued that the
government should have to prove a compelling interest in order to deny them the benefits.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–83.
64 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
65 Id. at 884–85. Such a test would place the burden of proof on the government to prove
that the law served a compelling interest in order to enforce a law that placed a burden on
religious exercise. Id. at 885–86.
66 Id. at 884–85.
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2012) (“in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”).
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law substantially burdens their religious exercise; 68 if they are able
to do so, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the law
serves a compelling governmental interest and is the “least
restrictive means” of achieving that interest. 69
B.

State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts

In 1997, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores. 70
After the decision, states began to pass their own versions, and
nineteen states currently have effective RFRA laws. 71 In these
states, claimants can make the same type of challenge to state laws
that was originally permitted under the federal RFRA. 72
These state laws range from extreme versions of the federal
law to somewhat more tempered versions. Many states have
adopted a “standard” RFRA that closely (or exactly) mirrors the
language of the federal RFRA. 73 However, some states have
expanded their RFRAs to provide even more rigorous protection for
religious claimants than the federal RFRA. 74 For example, Alabama’s
RFRA 75—unlike the federal law—is not limited to “substantial”
burdens and can be used to claim an exemption to a law that
burdens religious belief in any way. 76
Other state RFRAs have limitations that the federal law does
not. 77 While the federal RFRA applies to all federal law, some states
§ 2000bb(b)(2).
§ 2000bb-1.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which defines Congress’s power to enforce the provisions of the amendment.
Id. at 536. This was because RFRA, rather than being a “remedial” piece of legislation
rectifying Fourteenth Amendment violations, changed the “substantive” rights of religious
constitutional protections. Id. at 532. This analysis draws attention to the gap between
measured religious liberty under the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, and the extreme
religious liberty of RFRA, which provides much broader protections to religious claimants
than they are entitled to under the Constitution. For a more detailed explanation of the
importance of City of Boerne, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE
RULE OF LAW 203–37 (2005).
71 MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 29
(2014). In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2000cc-5. RLUIPA is still applicable to the States. § 2000cc-5.
72 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 29.
73 See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2015).
74 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 339–42.
75 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01.
76 Id. HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 342. This expansion of RFRA garners attention because
of its ability to empower businesses to discriminate against the LGBT community.
77 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.307 (West 2015); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2406(b) (West 2015); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011 (West 2015).
68
69
70
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have exempted certain areas of their law from challenges under
their RFRA. Pennsylvania, for instance, has incorporated a list of
statutes to which the protections of RFRA do not apply, including
drug laws, medical licensing laws, and abuse reporting laws.78
Texas and Missouri have a specific exception that specifies that
their RFRAs create no new rights with respect to civil rights laws. 79
Recently, there has been some pushback by state citizens
against RFRAs. Since 2010, only three states have passed new
RFRAs. 80 In 2012, both North Dakota and Colorado rejected
versions of the statute. 81 Michigan also declined to pass its own
state RFRA in 2014, although the bill was reintroduced for the 2015
session. 82 However, some states are currently pushing to expand
their RFRAs. For example, Oklahoma has recently introduced
legislation that would specifically allow businesses with religious
owners to discriminate on the basis of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation in the provision of goods and services. 83 Whether state
RFRAs will become the norm, and how closely they will mirror the
federal law, is still unknown.
C.

The Contraceptive Mandate and Hobby Lobby

When Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (ACA or Obamacare), 84 it required employers who
provided group health plans to provide “preventive care and
screenings” without any cost-sharing requirements. 85 Rather than
specifying what types of preventive care and contraception would
be provided, Congress left that determination to the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a branch of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 86 The HRSA
ultimately promulgated a regulation that required employers to
provide coverage for all FDA approved contraception. 87 The
contraceptive mandate created by HHS and HRSA exempted some

PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2406(b).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.307(2); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011.
Those states are Kansas, Kentucky, and Mississippi. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5303 (West
2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (2015).
81 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 29.
82 S.B. 0004, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015).
83 S.B. 440, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015).
84 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
85 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(3)–(4) (2012).
86 Id.
87 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15,
2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
78
79
80
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nonprofit corporations and religious entities, but not for-profit
corporations. 88
In 2012, both the Green family, owners of Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. and Mardel, Inc., and the Hahn family, owners of Conestoga
Wood Specialties, Inc., all for-profit corporations, brought suit
claiming the contraceptive mandate violated their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. 89 On appeal, Conestoga Wood’s
claim was rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which
stated that for-profit corporations were not protected under
RFRA. 90 Hobby Lobby and Mardel, however, were successful in the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which stated that for-profit
corporations did have a right to RFRA’s protection. 91 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the circuit
split and ruled in favor of the religious claimants, holding that forprofit corporations were entitled to RFRA’s protection, that their
exercise of religion was substantially burdened by the
contraceptive mandate, and that the government had not met the
required showing that the contraceptive mandate met the “least
restrictive means” test. 92 This decision broadened the scope of
religious exemptions that for-profit businesses can seek. White
separatist business owners would rely on this decision to bring a
RFRA challenge to Title VII.
D.

Title VII and White Separatist Corporations

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal
antidiscrimination law that prohibits discrimination in hiring based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 93 It also prohibits
segregating employees or applicants based on the same
classifications if it would negatively affect their employment or
employment opportunities. 94 Under Title VII, discrimination has
occurred when race or one of the other specified classifications are
used as a motivating factor for any employment decisions, even if

45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013).
Complaint at 2, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6192751 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (No. 5:12-CV-06744); Complaint at 3–4, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
2012 WL 4009450 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-12-1000-HE).
90 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
91 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
92 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). For a full discussion of the
Court’s analysis, see infra Part III. Because the corporations succeeded on their RFRA claim,
the Court did not decide the Free Exercise issue. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
93 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
94 § 2000e-2(a)(2).
88
89
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other factors were also considered. 95 It generally applies to
employers with more than fifteen employees, with some limited
exceptions for religious entities. 96 There is no exception given to
for-profit corporations, and if an employer violates Title VII, the
party whom it discriminated against may sue the employer. 97 If the
employer loses, it faces damages and may be required to hire or rehire the complaining party. 98
Given the conflict between Title VII’s antidiscrimination
mandate and the beliefs of white separatists, it is certainly possible
that a corporation owned by white separatists may try to use RFRA
to seek a religious exemption from Title VII. This Note contemplates
a corporation that, like the corporations in Hobby Lobby, is closely
held (that is, with the majority of stock owned by members of the
same family). 99 The owners of the corporation would identify
themselves as white separatists who believe in the basic tenets of
white separatism. 100 The corporation would employ more than
fifteen employees and would thus be subject to Title VII’s
requirements. 101
In dicta, the Hobby Lobby majority asserted that religious
exemptions allowing race discrimination, brought by people with
racist beliefs disguised as religious beliefs, would not be permitted
under its analysis of RFRA and the corporation’s claims.102
However, a claim brought by a white separatist corporation seeking
exemption from antidiscrimination hiring laws would look very
similar to the claim brought by the corporations in the Hobby Lobby
case. Such a corporation could easily make a prime facie case for
such an exemption, and it is even possible that the government
would not be able to meet its burden under the “least restrictive
means” test.

§ 2000e-2(m).
§ 2000e(a); accord § 2000e-1.
§ 2000e-5(g).
Id.
The definition of a “closely held” corporation is ambiguous. See infra Part III.C.1. In the
hypothetical presented by this Note, a “closely held” corporation is a business with all of the
stock owned by members of the same family, as the businesses in Hobby Lobby were.
However, the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby may allow for claims from corporations that
are not closely held. Id.
100 See supra Part I.
101 § 2000e(b).
102 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
95
96
97
98
99
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III. ANALYSIS OF RFRA CLAIMS AND RACE DISCRIMINATION POST-HOBBY
LOBBY
A.

Race, Religion, and the Burden of Complying with Title VII
1.

For-Profit “Persons” and RFRA

One of the most extensively briefed questions 103 raised by the
Hobby Lobby case, and one that garnered the most attention in both
media and academia, 104 was the question of whether Hobby Lobby,
Mardel, and Conestoga Wood were “persons” who could exercise
religious beliefs within the meaning of RFRA. HHS argued that forprofit corporations could not exercise religious belief, and therefore
were not able to raise a RFRA claim. 105 Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and
Conestoga Wood argued instead that RFRA referred to “persons,” a
term which under the Dictionary Act 106 includes corporations. 107
103 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-356) (“There is no principled basis on which to rule that for-profit
corporations by nature cannot exercise religion, while non-profits can. The scope of the
First Amendment and RFRA (and the Dictionary Act, for that matter) cannot and do not turn
on mere distinctions in the tax code.”); Brief for Respondents at 8, Conestoga Wood, 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356) (“Petitioner Conestoga, a for-profit corporation . . . is not itself a
person exercising religion within the meaning of RFRA.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5,
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (“[T]he reading of
RFRA’s text that best comports with our laws and traditions is one that does not confer
exemptions on for-profit corporations . . . .”); Brief for Respondents at 17, Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354) (“Congress knows how to limit statutory protections to a subset of
artificial entities or “persons,” and it chose not do so in RFRA.”).
104 Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J. F. 11 (2014); Alan J.
Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why ForProfit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014); Jeremy M.
Christiansen, Note, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . . Includes Corporations”: Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- and Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
623 (2013); Recent Case, First Amendment—Free Exercise of Religion—Tenth Circuit Holds
For-Profit Corporate Plaintiffs Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Substantial Burden on
Religious Exercise Claim.—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013),
127 HARV. L. REV. 1025 (2014); Adam Winkler, Yes, Corporations are People: And That’s Why
Hobby Lobby Should Lose at the Supreme Court, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:52 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/corporations_a
re_people_and_that_s_why_hobby_lobby_should_lose_at_the_supreme.html;
Appelbaum,
supra note 5.
105 Brief for Respondents, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 11–13; Reply Brief for
Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 6.
106 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”). The Dictionary Act controls the definition of words within the United States
Code. Id.
107 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 10; Brief for
Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 16–17. See also 1 U.S.C. § 1.
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The Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on
the Dictionary Act, and ruled that a for-profit corporation could
bring a RFRA claim. 108 Furthermore, the Court found no textual
basis in either RFRA or the Dictionary Act for drawing a distinction
between nonprofit and for-profit corporations. 109
The Hobby Lobby decision decisively settled that closely held,
for-profit corporations can bring a RFRA claim. 110 White separatist
business owners who chose to incorporate their business would
not, therefore, be barred from bringing a RFRA claim simply
because of the corporate form. Furthermore, since the
requirements of the contraceptive mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby
applied to businesses with fifty or more employees, and the
requirements of Title VII apply to businesses with fifteen or more
employees, the number of potential claimants for exemptions to
Title VII is vastly greater than for the Affordable Care Act. 111
2.

Sincere Religious Beliefs of the Claimants

After the Supreme Court held that Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and
Conestoga Wood could “exercise religion” and therefore, claim an
exemption under RFRA to the contraceptive mandate, it considered
whether the corporations’ claim that they opposed the use of
certain forms of birth control was an “exercise of religion” that
RFRA was meant to protect. 112 The Court found that the owners
believed that making the contraception at issue available to their
employees offended their religious beliefs, and ruled that their
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
Id. at 2769 (“No known understanding of the term “person” includes some but not all
corporations . . . . [I]t sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition
of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit
corporations.” (emphasis in original)).
110 Id.
111 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2) (an “applicable large employer” with more than fifty
employees must provide “minimum essential coverage” for health services). See also Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” for purposes of Title VII
as one who has fifteen or more employees working each day of the twenty previous weeks).
Each month in the first quarter of 2014, between nineteen and twenty million people
worked for an establishment (business providing goods or services, like Hobby Lobby) that
employed between twenty and forty-nine people. Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cew/
cewind.htm#year=2014&qtr=1&own=5&ind=10&size=4 (Last visited Feb. 26, 2016). These
employees would already work for an employer that was exempt from the Affordable Care
Act, but would be vulnerable to their employers seeking exemptions from Title VII.
112 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
108
109
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choice not to provide those forms of contraception was an exercise
of those beliefs. 113
The religious beliefs of the Hahns and the Greens fell squarely
within RFRA’s definition of “religious exercise.” RFRA protects “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” 114 This affords broad protection for all
kinds of religious exercise, even those that were not directly
affiliated with a common or well-known religion. 115 That the
owners’ beliefs were sincere and religious in nature was conceded
by HHS and was not challenged by the Supreme Court. 116
To succeed on a RFRA claim, a closely held white separatist
corporation would initially have to establish the sincerity and
religious nature of its belief—that mixing of the races is wrong. 117
Since the sincerity and religious nature of a claimant’s beliefs are
rarely questioned, this would not be a difficult assertion for it to
make. 118 In Hobby Lobby, neither the briefs from the parties nor any
113 Id. at 2770 (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ involves ‘not only belief and profession but
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in for religious
reasons.’” (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)).).
114 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
115 Id. However, the Hobby Lobby claimants were all members of the Christian faith.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66. The Hahns were members of the Mennonite Church; the
Greens did not specify which Christian denomination with which they affiliated. Id.
116 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774; Brief for Respondents, Conestoga Wood, supra note
103, at 7 (“The Hahns’ sincerely held religious opposition to certain forms of contraception
is not subject to question in these proceedings”); Reply Brief for Petitioners, Hobby Lobby,
supra note 103, at 5 (“We acknowledge that the Greens’ religious beliefs are sincerely
held”). HHS did raise some practical concerns about determining the sincerity of a
corporation’s religious belief, but the majority theorized that if Congress was confident in
the Court’s ability to determine the sincerity of claims brought by prisoners under RLUIPA,
there was no reason to believe that they would exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA
over the same issue. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (“If Congress thought that the federal
courts were up to the job of dealing with insincere prisoner claims, there is no reason to
believe that Congress limited RFRA’s reach out of concern for the seemingly less difficult
task of doing the same in corporate cases.”).
117 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
118 Conceding the question of the sincerity and religious nature of a claimant’s belief is
squarely in line with the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise and RFRA jurisprudence. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006)
(government conceding sincerity of claimant’s religious belief); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (claimant’s sincerity not analyzed); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (no challenge to claimant’s sincere belief in
sacrificing animals for religious purposes); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 919 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no challenge to sincerity of claimant’s
religious beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 138 n.2
(1987) (considering a Free Exercise claim where no party disputed that claimant’s
conversion to Seventh-Day Adventism was genuine); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257
(1982) (considering a Free Exercise claim where claimant’s sincerity was undisputed);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (declining to review
the conclusion of an administrative board that petitioner held sincere religious beliefs);
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amicus briefs attempted to challenge either the sincerity or the
religious nature of the Hahns’ or Greens’ beliefs. The absence of
such an analysis was echoed in the majority and dissent, with both
acknowledging that the parties conceded the legitimacy of the
beliefs and declining to proceed further on the question. 119
However, the corporations did make a minimal assertion
regarding the sincerity and religious nature of their beliefs. 120 A
white separatist corporation could easily make a similar assertion
of sincerity. First, the fulfillment of the sincerity requirement would
likely not be questioned, as is the case in most RFRA claims;
however, even if the sincerity of its beliefs were disputed, it would
likely succeed if the corporation could point to actions it took that
aligned with other white separatist beliefs. 121 For example, a
member of the CCC might point to regular attendance at a Christian
church, volunteering for environmental conservation projects, or
choosing to live in a neighborhood that is predominantly white. 122
Since these activities are connected to white separatist beliefs, they
would be indicative of the claimant’s sincerity. Few federal courts
have seriously contemplated the sincerity of a claimant’s beliefs, so
such actions would likely be sufficient to prove sincerity. 123

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (state stipulated to sincerity of claimant’s
religious belief); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (not disputing the sincerity of a
conscientious objector’s belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963)
(considering a Free Exercise claim where no party disputed the sincerity or religious nature
of the claimant’s belief); Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pa., 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943)
(considering a Free Exercise claim where no party disputed the sincerity or religious nature
of the claimant’s belief). But see United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718 (10th Cir.
2010) (upholding as a matter of law a district court ruling that the claimant’s belief that
marijuana was “a deity and a sacrament” was not sincere). Courts have been more open to
questioning a claimant’s sincerity under RLUIPA. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725
n.13 (2005) (“[T]he Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s
professed religiosity.”).
119 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
120 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 4 (“The Hahns are a
Mennonite family from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. They hail from a religious tradition
known for incorporating faith into every aspect of life, including business.”); Brief for
Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 8 (“The Greens each signed a Statement of
Faith and a Trustee Commitment obligating them to conduct the businesses according to
their religious beliefs, to ‘honor God with all that has been entrusted’ to them, and to ‘use
the Green family assets to create, support, and leverage the efforts of Christian ministries.’”).
The brief for Hobby Lobby and Mardel also pointed to the business’s refusal to make
business decisions that did not comport with the family’s religious beliefs at its expense,
such as closing on Sundays and refusing to sell shot glasses. Id. at 9.
121 Brief for Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 8. See Ben Adams & Cynthia
Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 59, 62–63 (2014).
122 Statement of Principles, supra note 29.
123 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. 418 (government conceding sincerity of claimant’s
religious belief). In claims under RLUIPA, sincerity is more frequently questioned. See
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (“[P]rison gangs use religious activity to cloak their illicit and
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The religious nature of the business owners’ beliefs in Hobby
Lobby was even less disputed than their sincerity; while the parties
conceded, and the Court noted, that sincerity of belief was not
disputed, the religious nature of the belief was not even
mentioned. 124 This is probably because the owners all asserted that
they belonged to the Christian faith, the predominant religion in
America. 125 Furthermore, the connection between abortion or
contraception, and religion, has been a central issue in the public
and political sphere since the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions
in Griswold v. Connecticut 126 and Roe v. Wade. 127
Although the link between religion and white separatists’ racist
beliefs is not at the forefront of public awareness, a white separatist
corporation would still easily be able to prove that its belief was
religious in nature. After the initial passage of RFRA, it seemed that
some federal courts were prepared to provide guidance, if not an
outright definition, of what it meant for a belief to be “religious.”128
However, when RFRA was amended in 2000, Congress added
language indicating that a religious belief need not be tied to a
system of religion or be mandated by that religion. 129 Federal courts

often violent conduct . . . . [P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner’s
religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.”). But even in
RLUIPA claims, federal courts seem reluctant to require anything more than a minimal
assertion that the beliefs are sincere, unless the defendant can directly refute that sincerity.
See, e.g., Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012)
(noting that “[s]incerity is generally presumed or easily established,” looking to “the words
and actions of the inmate” to establish sincerity, and holding that a “showing of sincerity
does not necessarily require strict doctrinal adherence to standards created by organized
religious hierarchies”).
124 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. See generally Reply Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga
Wood, supra note 103; Brief for Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103.
125 Religious Landscape Survey, PEW RES. CTR., http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016). Various Christian denominations, combined together, total
about 70% of the U.S. public. Id. While federal courts have allowed religious exemptions for
a wide variety of religions, when they have rejected claims for religious exemptions for lack
of sincerity, the claims have been for exemptions rooted in religions other than Christianity.
See, e.g., United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718 (10th Cir. 2010).
126 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy extends to a
married couple’s decision to use birth control).
127 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy protects a
woman’s decision to choose to have an abortion up to a certain point in the pregnancy).
128 See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483–84 (10th Cir. 1996) (listing
factors that could be indicia of religion, such as the metaphysical nature of and
comprehensiveness of the beliefs, and whether there were “[a]ccoutrements of religion,”
such as prophets, a hierarchy, special clothing, or attempts to convert others).
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”).
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have yet to articulate a RFRA standard, in light of this amendment,
for judging whether a belief is religious or secular. 130
Therefore, even if a court were to consider whether a white
separatist’s racist beliefs are religious, the broad definition supplied
by the RFRA amendment makes it likely that the court would find
the requirement fulfilled. For many white separatist groups, their
racist beliefs are directly tied to their religious beliefs through their
desire for a culturally homogeneous America. 131 Such groups assert
that America should be exclusive, not to the white race entirely, but
solely to the Christian faith. 132 Some white separatist groups, such
as Christian Identity, even espouse the view that the Christian faith
is an exclusively white religion, and that other racial groups are
subhuman in God’s eyes. 133 The connection between the racist and
religious beliefs of white separatists are therefore even more
persuasive than the connection between contraceptive use,
abortion, and the beliefs of the business owners in Hobby Lobby,
who did not assert or provide evidence of any direct connection
between their beliefs and their religion. 134
3.

The Substantial Burden of the Contraceptive Mandate

Under RFRA, persons exercising their religious beliefs may
claim exemptions from laws that substantially burden that exercise,
even if the burden results from a neutral, generally applicable
law. 135 The claim made by the corporations in Hobby Lobby was that
the contraceptive mandate placed a substantial burden on their
exercise of religion. 136 They argued for an exemption from the
contraceptive mandate because facilitating the provision of the
objectionable forms of birth control to their female employees
violated their religious beliefs, and compelling them to do so
substantially burdened the exercise of this belief. 137 Conestoga

130 See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion
Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study
Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123,
168–175 (2007).
131 Statement of Principles, supra note 29.
132 Id.
133 Christian Identity Movement Spreads Race-Hate, supra note 23. See generally BARKUN,
supra note 36.
134 See generally Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103; Brief for
Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103.
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
136 Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 32–34; Brief for
Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 34.
137 Brief for Petitioners, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 32–34; Brief for
Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 34.

Martin.2016 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/23/2016 5:53 PM

R A C E , R E LI G I O N , A N D R F R A

21

Wood argued that the Mennonite faith specifically compelled them
to incorporate their religious beliefs into their business practices;138
Hobby Lobby and Mardel argued that they would face severe
economic consequences if they did not comply with the mandate. 139
The Supreme Court agreed that the HHS mandate imposed a
substantial burden on the corporations’ religious beliefs. 140 The
majority focused on the economic consequences that the companies
would face if they chose not to comply with the mandate. 141 The
Court also asserted that if the companies chose to drop health care
entirely for their employees, in order to avoid this tax, then they
would also face severe economic penalties, and that dropping all
health care for their employees would similarly be a burden on the
defendants because skilled workers, seeking jobs with healthcare
plans, would chose to work elsewhere. 142
The majority also rejected the argument advanced by HHS that
the link between the companies’ beliefs (that the destruction of an
embryo is wrong) and the actions they were being asked to take
(making the contraceptives available to their employees) was too
attenuated to substantially burden their religious exercise. 143
Ultimately, the Court ruled the companies’ religious beliefs
compelled them to provide health care to their employees that did
not comport with the rule of the mandate. 144 Since providing health
care—which aligned with their beliefs—would cost them an
enormous amount of money, effectively forcing them to choose

138 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014) (citing
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).
139 Brief for Respondents, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 36–38.
140 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–79.
141 Id. at 2775–76.
142 Id. at 2776–77. The Court briefly addressed in dicta the argument raised by amicus
briefs that dropping all health coverage would not place a substantial burden on the
companies’ religious exercise because the penalty is less than the average cost of providing
insurance. Id. This argument was rejected seemingly on the ground that the companies also
had religious motivations for providing health insurance to their employees. Id.
143 Id. at 2777–78. Justice Alito wrote:

This argument dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether the HHS
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to
conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs) and instead addresses
a very different question that the federal courts have no business addressing
(whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable) . . . . This belief
implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy,
namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act
that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the
commission of an immoral act by another . . . . HHS and the principal dissent in
effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have
repeatedly refused to take such a step.

Id. at 2778 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
144 Id. at 2776.
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between doing business or practicing their religion, the mandate
was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. 145
Under this interpretation of “substantial burden,” a white
separatist corporation would easily be able to satisfy the Court’s
standard. Title VII, which mandates that any business with more
than fifteen employees not discriminate on the basis of race in
hiring, would burden a white separatist corporation’s religious
beliefs by compelling its members to associate with different races.
For a white separatist business owner with a sincere religious belief
that people of different races should not associate with each other,
this statute directly interferes with his religious exercise.
As discussed above, the centrality of a white separatist’s belief
against association between races, or how strongly compelled it is
by his religious beliefs, is irrelevant to the consideration of how
substantial the burden is on the claimant. 146 The Court in Hobby
Lobby made this clear when it rejected HHS’s argument that the link
between the Hahns’ and Greens’ religious belief (that abortion is
wrong) and what the statute required (providing birth control they
believed were “abortifacients”) was too attenuated. 147
This makes an even stronger case for a white separatist
corporation to assert a substantial burden, because there is no
attenuation at all between their religious beliefs and their racism; in
fact, their racism is a direct mandate of their revisionist
interpretation of Christian texts. To compare, if forcing the
corporations in Hobby Lobby to provide a healthcare plan that made
certain forms of “objectionable” birth control available was a
substantial burden, then forcing them to cover their employees’
abortions would certainly be a substantial burden, as there is a
more direct tension between the law’s requirement and the
religious beliefs. That direct tension also exists between Title VII
and white separatists’ beliefs. For a white separatist business
owner, Title VII directly burdens his religious belief—that
associating with other races is wrong—by mandating that he
145 Id. at 2779. The majority also pointed out that not providing any health coverage
would make the corporation less competitive in the hiring process, as many employees
might prefer to have employer-sponsored healthcare coverage. Id. at 2776–77. This also
made it a burden for the companies to drop healthcare entirely. Id.
146 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”).
147 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78. “Abortifacient” forms of birth control prevent a
fertilized egg from attaching to a woman’s womb. Id. at 2762–63. To the Hobby Lobby
claimants, this is tantamount to an abortion. Id. at 2759.
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choose between running a business with more than fifteen
employees or practicing his religion. 148
The burden on a white separatist business would arguably be
even greater than that of the corporations in Hobby Lobby, because
unlike the contraceptive mandate, private corporations do not have
a choice between meeting Title VII requirements or paying a
penalty. 149 Furthermore, violating Title VII exposes an employer to
a civil suit, which may result in the hiring of the employees initially
rejected. 150 Therefore, even direct and willful violation of Title VII
would not guarantee that a business owner could conduct his
business in accordance with his religious beliefs.
Given the simplicity of asserting and proving a prima facie
RFRA claim under Hobby Lobby and federal RFRA jurisprudence,
broadening the scope of RFRA claims to allow protection of forprofit corporations’ religious beliefs makes it substantially more
likely that private business owners with racist beliefs will assert
such a claim. For the government to continue enforcing
antidiscrimination laws against such claimants, it will have to prove
that the law serves a compelling interest and is the “least restrictive
means” of serving that interest.
B.

The Government’s Compelling Interest and the “Least Restrictive
Means”
1.

The Federal Government Has a Compelling Interest in
Preventing Race Discrimination in Employment

Once religious claimants satisfy their prima facie case under
RFRA, the burden then shifts to the government to prove that the
challenged statute serves a compelling government interest, and is
the “least restrictive means” of achieving that interest. 151 In Hobby
Lobby, HHS asserted that there were several compelling interests,

148 In contrast, a statute is not a substantial burden if it only affects the subjective
spiritual experience of a religious claimant, or if it does not threaten sanctions, or condition
benefits, on a claimant violating their religious beliefs. E.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the religious claimant’s contention that
placing fake recreational snow on mountains they believed to be sacred was a substantial
burden on their religious practice). This would certainly not be the case for a white
separatist business owner, who must comply with Title VII’s mandate that he take action in
direct violation of his beliefs or face civil suits. § 2000e-5.
149 § 2000e-2(a). The statute mandates that employers may not refuse to hire an
applicant on the basis of race, without providing any exceptions for for-profit corporations.
Id.
150 § 2000e-5(f)–(g).
151 § 2000bb-1(b).
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such as public health and gender equality. 152 The Department also
asserted an “interest in ensuring that all women have access to all
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.” 153 The Court
expressed some skepticism over the arguments, suggesting that the
interests cited may be too broad or unpersuasive given that other
healthcare plans could exclude the contraceptive mandate. 154
Ultimately, however, there is little analysis of the “compelling
interest” standard in Hobby Lobby because the Court assumed,
without expressly deciding, that the government had a compelling
interest. 155 However, if a white separatist business owner were to
bring a RFRA claim, a court would almost certainly find a
compelling government interest in preventing race discrimination
in employment. 156
Federal courts have upheld the validity of Title VII numerous
times as a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 157 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has held that the government has a compelling interest in
preventing race discrimination, even in light of religious objections.
In Bob Jones University v. United States, 158 the Court faced a
challenge to portions of the tax code—interpreted by the IRS—that
denied the University tax-exempt status because of its racially
discriminatory admissions policy. 159 The Court directly stated that
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
Id.
Id. at 2779–80. (“[M]any employees—those covered by grandfathered plans and those
who work for employers with fewer than 50 employees—may have no contraceptive
coverage without cost sharing at all.”).
155 Id. at 2780.
156 The Court’s skepticism of the Government’s articulated interests in Hobby Lobby may
call the government’s interest in Title VII into question. A similar argument might be made
for Title VII: since it allows some organizations to discriminate in some ways, an asserted
interest in racial equality might be too broad. However, because the Court has recognized
the government’s interest in Title VII in many cases, it is far more likely that, similar to
Hobby Lobby, the Court will assume a compelling interest in adjudicating a RFRA claim
against Title VII.
157 For instance, in Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001), the
court ruled that because Congress had enacted Title VII to remedy an identified wrong of
race and gender discrimination in employment, and Title VII is proportional and congruent
to the wrong identified by Congress, the statute’s abrogation of State sovereign immunity
was valid. Id. at 626–28. Federal courts have also held the section of Title VII proscribing
discrimination in hiring valid against Establishment Clause challenges. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 618 (1987) (“[F]ew would contend that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which both forbids religious discrimination by private-sector employers . . . and
requires them reasonably to accommodate the religious practices of their
employees . . . violates the Establishment Clause.”) (citations omitted); Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (rejecting
the argument that Title VII violates the Establishment Clause).
158 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
159 Id. at 581.
152
153
154
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the government had a compelling interest in “eradicating racial
discrimination in education.” 160 Moreover, it ruled that the
government’s compelling interest “substantially outweigh[ed]” the
burden placed on its religious beliefs. 161 Thus, the IRS’s refusal to
grant tax-exempt status was not a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. 162
In light of the government’s compelling interest in preventing
and eradicating racial discrimination, it would seem that a claim
from a white separatist business owner might fail despite the
claimant’s prima facie case. However, RFRA also demands that the
government prove the statute is the “least restrictive means” of
achieving that interest. 163
2.

Despite the Government’s Compelling Interest, Title VII May
Not be the Least Restrictive Means to Achieve its Goal

RFRA first introduced the “least restrictive means” test into
Free Exercise doctrine. 164 The Act states that to burden the exercise
of religion, the government must prove that the method employed
by the challenged statute is the least restrictive method. 165 This
means that when the Court is considering whether the statute is the
least restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s interest,
the law must be tailored to fit the specific religious beliefs and
needs of the believer bringing the claim. 166 The government or
agency enforcing the statute has the burden of proving that the
statute passes this test. 167 It is a test that—when applied to statutes
that are challenged as imposing a burden on the claimant’s
religion—is “exceptionally demanding” and requires the
governmental entity being challenged to demonstrate that it has no
other way to accomplish its interest that does not burden the
religious exercise of the claimants. 168 The standard imposed by
160 Id. at 604. When RFRA applied to the states, the Supreme Court of California also
acknowledged that the government had a compelling interest in preventing race
discrimination. See Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 952 (1996).
161 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
162 Id. at 602–04.
163 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
164 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 21.
165 § 2000bb-1(b)(2) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person . . . is the least
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.”) (emphasis added).
166 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 21.
167 § 2000bb-1(b).
168 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) (articulating the test
as requiring the government to show “it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal
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RFRA, a heightened form of strict scrutiny, is a departure from the
Court’s typical “rationality review” that it uses to examine neutral,
generally applicable laws. 169
In Hobby Lobby, HHS claimed that the preventive services
coverage provision satisfied the “least restrictive means” test
because both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood had the option to
either provide the required coverage, or, to not offer a health plan,
allow its employees to obtain coverage through the healthcare
exchanges, and pay a tax. 170 The Department also argued that
Hobby Lobby’s suggestion of a less restrictive means—namely that
the government pay for the forms of contraception that they
objected to providing for their employees—was not a valid
alternative. 171
The Court disagreed with the HHS analysis. The majority found
that the mandate did not satisfy the “least restrictive means” test
because the government could take on the cost of providing the
contraception to Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood employees. 172

without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties”).
See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997).
169 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 21 (“As Justice Powell stated in 1980, and it still remains
true, ‘this “means” test has been virtually impossible to satisfy.’”). While rationality review
defers to the legislature and presumes the law is constitutional, the “compelling interest”
and “least restrictive means” tests presume the law is unconstitutional, and puts the burden
of proof on the government to demonstrate the law is constitutional. Id. at 20–21. The “least
restrictive means” test places a heightened burden on the government, even above strict
scrutiny, which is so famously referred to as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
170 Brief for Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, supra note 103, at 57; Brief for Respondents,
Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 57.
171 Brief for Respondents, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 55 (“RFRA’s lessrestrictive means test does not require Congress to create or expand federal programs.”).
HHS argued that the Greens’ theory was irreconcilable with the Court’s decision in United
States v Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), where the Court held that a government-funded scheme
was not a less-restrictive alternative to an Amish employer paying Social Security taxes.
Brief for Respondents, Conestoga Wood, supra note 103, at 57.
172 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 (quoting RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c): “[this
statute] may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise”). Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
stated:
It seems likely . . . that the cost of providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in
these cases (if not all FDA-approved contraceptives) would be minor when
compared with the overall cost of ACA. . . . If, as HHS tells us, providing all women
with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception is a
Government interest of the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS’s
argument that it cannot be required under RFRA to pay anything in order to
achieve this important goal. . . . RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some
circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds to
accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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The majority opinion also stated that even if the creation of a new
program, or the modification of an already existing program, were
not appropriate alternatives under the “least restrictive means”
test, HHS had still failed to show that the mandate fulfilled the test’s
requirements because there was already a method used by HHS to
provide the contraception to women employed by those employers
exempt from the mandate. 173 Therefore, Hobby Lobby ruled, in part,
that under the “least restrictive means” test, it may be an
appropriate alternative for the government to take on additional
economic and administrative burdens that would have been the
responsibility of the RFRA claimant had the claimant not asserted a
religious exemption. 174
In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out that HHS
could not refute that the Court’s solution was a less restrictive
means because HHS had already created an exception for religious
organizations and nonprofits. 175 Similarly, a white separatist
business owner bringing a RFRA claim could argue that Title VII has
an exception that allows for race discrimination in hiring for
religious organizations. 176 The exception states that the
requirements of Title VII do not apply to several types of religious
organizations, including religious corporations, in the context of
employing individuals of a particular religion. 177 Furthermore,
although the EEOC and federal courts have held that the exception
does not apply to for-profit businesses, the Hobby Lobby ruling calls
that holding into question, since the majority ruled the exception to
the contraceptive mandate could be extended to for-profit
corporations. 178 The exemption is a religious accommodation that
for-profit corporations could use to argue that, because Title VII
already has exceptions for religious organizations, it fails the “least
restrictive means” test. 179

173 Id. at 2782 (“HHS has already established an accommodation for nonprofit
organizations with religious objections.”).
174 Id. at 2780–82. The majority also stated, “[w]e do not decide today whether an
approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims. At a
minimum, however, it does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious belief . . . and it serves
HHS’s stated interests equally well.” Id. at 2782 (footnote omitted).
175 Id.
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
177 Id. (“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation . . . with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation . . . .”).
178 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of
Corporate Identity, GEO. WASH. L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS 1, 31 (2015), http://
scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2347&context=faculty_publications.
179 Id. The majority in Hobby Lobby also expressed some doubt as to whether the
government had a compelling interest because the contraceptive mandate did not apply
uniformly. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. Although Title VII would almost certainly pass
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Furthermore, federal courts deciding RFRA cases tend to hold
that a federal law is the least restrictive means when creating an
exception to the statute would lead to a large number of potential
claims, especially if the claims would diminish the practicality of
enforcing the statute. For example, in Adams v. C.I.R., the Third
Circuit rejected a RFRA claim, finding that the federal tax system
was the “least restrictive means” of furthering the government’s
compelling interest in a uniform system of taxation. 180 In doing so,
the court pointed out that such an exemption would be
impracticable, considering the wide variety of religious claimants
that might demand a similar exemption and the administrative
difficulties that would result. 181 However, allowing white
separatists an exemption would not present the same
administrative difficulties because while white separatists are
politically active, they do not constitute a significant majority in the
United States. Unlike the wide variety of religious claimants the
Third Circuit foresaw asking for exemptions in Adams, the potential
claimants under Hobby Lobby’s reasoning would constitute only
white separatist business owners with racist religious beliefs, a far
smaller minority than the new group contemplated in Adams, which
might have included every American taxpayer. 182
Title VII might also fail the “least restrictive means” test
because a similar exception already exists for other religious
organizations. 183 While the Court in Hobby Lobby stated that there

the “compelling interest” test, the existence of an exception similar to the contraceptive
mandate might call that into question.
180 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
181 Id. at 179 (citing a “practical need of the government for uniform administration of
taxation, given particularly difficult problems with administration should exceptions on
religious grounds be carved out by the courts . . . . [W]e can easily imagine a plethora of
other sects that would also have an equally legitimate concern with the usage of tax dollars
to fund activities antithetical to their religion”). Similarly, in United States v. Wilgus, 638
F.3d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit addressed a claim against the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Act), where a claimant who was not affiliated with any
Native American tribe but was an adherent of a Native American religion used RFRA as a
defense against prosecution for illegally acquiring eagle feathers. The District Court
proposed a less restrictive alternative that would allow all sincere adherents of the Native
American religion to apply for a permit to obtain eagle feathers. Id. at 1292. Although the
Tenth Circuit agreed that would be less burdensome on Wilgus’s practice of religion, the
court stated that the government’s interest would be “drastically impacted” by the
alternative, due in large part to the number of claims that would result and the problems
presented in enforcing the alternative. Id. at 1292–93.
182 Adams, 170 F.3d at 179.
183 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). There is also an exception to Title VII for certain
religious organizations known as the ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) (“The
interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is
undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who
will . . . carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging
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would be no less restrictive alternative to the “categorical
requirement to pay taxes,” the contraceptive mandate was not a
“categorical requirement” because HHS had created exceptions to
the mandate. 184 Similarly, the requirements of Title VII are not
categorical because there is already an exception to that rule. 185 The
exception would undermine the argument that the government has
no less restrictive alternative for enforcing antidiscrimination
laws. 186
In Hobby Lobby, the Court allowed the corporations seeking
religious exemptions to discriminate against their employees on the
basis of gender, by allowing them to cover full healthcare for their
male employees but only part of the required coverage for
women. 187 In doing so, the majority did not foresee a flood of
religious objections, nor did they imagine that allowing some forprofit corporations to decline that coverage would have a
substantial impact on women and discrimination in the
workplace. 188 A white separatist business owner seeking to
discriminate on the basis of race could argue that allowing a limited
exemption to those with sincere, religious, and racist beliefs would
have a similarly limited impact.

that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us.”). But the ministerial exception differs from the exception at issue in Hobby Lobby in that
it is not part of the statute, but rather an exception mandated by the Constitution. Therefore,
since the ministerial exception does not indicate that the legislature intended for additional
exceptions, it does not suggest that Title VII would fail the “least restrictive means” test.
184 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2758, 2784 (2014).
185 § 2000e-1(a).
186 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436
(2006) (holding that the government’s compelling interest in applying the Controlled
Substances Act uniformly did not preclude granting an exemption “given the longstanding
exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for religious use of peyote”).
187 HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 2.
188 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783–85.
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The Dicta Limits of the Hobby Lobby Ruling Would Not be
Sufficient to Prevent Racial Discrimination by Employers

1.

“Closely Held” Corporations189 are not the Minority of
Companies

Many commentators seeking to contradict claims that the
Hobby Lobby decision was too broad pointed to the majority
opinion’s contention that the ruling would apply only to “closely
held” corporations. 190 The implication of this argument is that if
Hobby Lobby only allows closely held corporations to seek RFRA
exemptions, the case will not enable many other employers to seek
similar exemptions, and thus the ruling is limited in scope.
However, this argument fails for two reasons: first, closely held
corporations account for around ninety percent of American
businesses 191 and employ approximately 60.4 million Americans;192
second, the rationales behind the majority opinion’s justification of
expanding RFRA protections to closely held corporations could
easily apply to other corporations as well. 193

189 What the majority in Hobby Lobby meant by a “closely held” corporation is somewhat
ambiguous. The IRS defines a closely held corporation as a corporation with “more than
50% of the value of its outstanding stock [which] is, directly or indirectly, owned by or for
five or fewer individuals” and “is not a personal service corporation.” Publication 542,
Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 3 (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
p542.pdf. Personal service corporations include the fields of law, accounting, performing
arts, and others. Id. However, Hobby Lobby was organized as an “S” corporation, which can
have up to 100 shareholders. Drew Desilver, What is a ‘Closely Held Corporation,’ Anyway,
and How Many are There?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corporation-anyway-and-how-many-are-there.
This suggests that the definition of “closely held” for the purposes of a Hobby Lobby analysis
is broader than the IRS definition.
190 See, e.g., Emma Green, The Supreme Court Isn’t Waging a War on Women in Hobby
Lobby, THE ATLANTIC (June 30, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/
06/hobby-lobby-isnt-waging-a-war-on-women/373717/2 (“Love it or loathe it, the Hobby
Lobby decision is limited in scope”); Kate Pickert, 4 Reasons the Supreme Court
Contraception Ruling Means Less Than You Think, TIME (June 30, 2014), http://time.com/
2940952/supreme-court-hobby-lobby-obamacare-ruling; Pete Williams, Hobby Lobby
Ruling: Employers Don’t Have to Cover Birth Control, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2014, 10:19 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hobby-lobby-ruling-employers-dont-havecover-birth-control-n144321 (referring to the Hobby Lobby decision as “limited” to closely
held, for-profit companies).
191 See Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling Raises Question: What
Does ‘Closely Held’ Mean?, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-held-mean-1404154577.
192 Alison Griswold, How Many People Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Affect?, SLATE (June
30, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/06/30/hobby_lobby_
supreme_court_ruling_how_many_people_work_at_closely_held_corporations.html.
193 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Rejects Contraceptives Mandate for Some Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
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It might be argued that such numbers are misleading because
many closely held corporations are small businesses, likely to have
fewer than fifty employees, and therefore not covered by the
Affordable Care Act and the contraceptive mandate. 194 However, it
should be noted that there are many large corporations that could
be defined as closely held, including Dell, and Koch Industries.195
The ruling thus has the potential to apply to tens of millions of
Americans. 196 More importantly, if a white separatist business
owner argued for an exemption to Title VII, there would be a
substantially greater number of companies subject to the
requirements potentially seeking an exemption. The requirements
of Title VII apply to any business that has more than fifteen
employees, bringing many more closely held corporations into the
sphere of potential RFRA claimants challenging Title VII.197
Therefore, even if the Hobby Lobby ruling only applies to closely
held corporations, the potential impact is far reaching.
But the majority’s logic extending RFRA to closely held, forprofit corporations does not necessarily preclude a for-profit that is
not closely held from bringing a similar claim. The Court pointed
out that under the Dictionary Act, the definition of “person” made
no distinction between nonprofit and for-profit corporations;
therefore, if nonprofits could assert religious beliefs to avoid
complying with the contraceptive mandate, as the statute allowed,
then for-profits could as well. 198 However, the Dictionary Act also
does not distinguish between corporations that are closely held and
those that are not. 199 Therefore, the same logic under this
interpretation of the Dictionary Act could just as easily extend
exemptions to corporations that are not closely held.

2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/hobby-lobby-case-supreme-courtcontraception.html.
194 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012) (an “applicable large employer” with more than
fifty employees must provide “minimum essential coverage” for health services). See Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
195 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Armour &
Feintzeig, supra note 191; Miriam Berg, Myths v. Facts on the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby
Ruling,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
(July
8,
2014,
6:00
PM),
http://
www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/elections-politics/blog/myths-v-facts-hobby-lobbybirth-control; Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, “Unconstitutional
Conditions,” and Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 9:07 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-unconstitutionalconditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes.
196 Griswold, supra note 192; Berg, supra note 195.
197 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
198 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (“HHS concedes that a nonprofit corporation can be a
‘person’ within the meaning of RFRA. . . . This concession effectively dispatches any
argument that the term ‘person’ as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held
corporations involved in these cases.” (citation omitted)).
199 1 U.S.C. § 1.
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The majority relied more on practical concerns that would
limit the ruling to closely held corporations, rather than any legal
rationale. 200 Justice Alito stated that it seemed unlikely that
corporate giants or publicly traded companies would be able to
demonstrate a unified religious belief that could be attributed to the
corporation. 201 However, there are corporations that are not
closely held, but have the majority of stock owned by one family,
who could impose their religious beliefs on the company. 202 The
Hobby Lobby decision, therefore, did not forbid or foreclose the
possibility of a company not closely held asserting a similar RFRA
claim. 203 The holding merely tabled the discussion for a later date
and, by relying on the Dictionary Act, provided strong precedent
suggesting that publicly traded corporations could assert nearly
identical claims. 204
2.

The Alternative Means Proposed by the Court for Achieving the
Government’s Interest is Not Limited to Healthcare 205

The majority in Hobby Lobby also limited the ruling in dicta by
stating that it was deciding the case based solely on the
contraceptive mandate, and that other healthcare mandates or
federal laws would require a fresh analysis. 206 Specifically, the
Court stated that discrimination on the basis of race, disguised as
religious belief, would not be possible under the majority’s analysis
because the government had a compelling interest in preventing
race discrimination, and that antidiscrimination laws were
precisely tailored. 207 The majority did not discuss how it reached
these conclusions. 208
200 CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RES. SERV., R43654, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION BY CLOSELYHELD CORPORATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. 3 (2014).
201 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
202 Greenfield, supra note 195 (“Walmart, for example, is publicly traded. But a majority
of its stock is owned by the Walton family, and they could impose their religious beliefs on
the company with ease.”).
203 BROUGHER, supra note 200, at 3.
204 Id.
205 The Hobby Lobby decision only challenged four contraceptives that the plaintiffs
believed were “abortifacients.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. There has been much debate
about the term, but because this Note addresses the potential of a racially discriminatory
RFRA claim, this debate is beyond this Note’s scope. However, it is important to note that
whether or not the contraceptives in question were “abortifacients” is irrelevant for the
purposes of a RFRA analysis; the Court does not analyze whether the beliefs are reasonable
or scientifically sound. Id. at 2778.
206 Id. at 2783.
207 Id.
208 One factor the majority pointed to as a limitation on the ruling is that under the
alternative scheme they proposed for providing contraception, there would be no third-
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This passage fails to limit the scope of the Hobby Lobby ruling
for two reasons. First, the majority provided no guidance for the
conclusion that antidiscrimination laws would satisfy the “narrow
tailoring” test. 209 The federal RFRA and its subsequent
interpretations, including Hobby Lobby, have shown that satisfying
the prima facie case for the claimant is simple. 210 Therefore, if a
RFRA claim to discriminate on the basis of race was barred, it would
be because the government met its burden of showing the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest. But the
majority in Hobby Lobby assumed, for the purposes of its analysis,
that the government had a compelling interest in providing the
contested forms of contraception. The Hobby Lobby decision is
therefore limited to healthcare only if one presumes that the
contraceptive mandate uniquely failed the least restrictive means
test. However, as already discussed, it is possible that some
antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII, do not satisfy the least
restrictive means test. 211

party impact. Id. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women
employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be
precisely zero.”). Allowing racial discrimination in hiring, in contrast, would have an
obvious detriment to third parties that is not as easily absorbed into pre-existing
government schemes. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that the Court’s decision denied
women rights that they were entitled to by law. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the
Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs
no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the
corporation owners’ religious faith . . . .”). It is important to note that the Court’s ruling in
Hobby Lobby did not trigger coverage of the corporations’ employees under their proposed
alternatives. Such accommodations would have to be provided through statute or
regulation. See HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 354. Although the government has solicited
comments on proposed regulation that would allow employees of these corporations to be
covered by the HHS accommodation, no new ruling or regulation has been adopted or put
into effect. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 51118, (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 54, 29 C.F.R. 2590, 45
C.F.R. 147). It therefore seems that the Supreme Court, while suggesting alternatives that
would theoretically have no third-party impact, is not opposed to creating religious
exemptions that have true third-party impact in practice. The negative impact of granting
exemptions to white separatist employers would therefore not prevent such exemptions
from being granted.
209 That the majority stated that antidiscrimination laws were “precisely tailored,” not
“the least restrictive means,” is interesting and perhaps telling. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2783. “Narrow tailoring,” which is usually part of the strict scrutiny standard, is less
rigorous than the “least restrictive means” test, which requires that laws be tailored to the
specific needs of each claimant. HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 21. Therefore, even if the Court
had explained why such laws are “precisely tailored,” it doesn’t necessarily follow that they
would also satisfy the “least restrictive means” test.
210 See supra Part III.A.
211 See supra Part III.B. See also Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Restoring Religious
Freedom to the Workplace: Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2513, 2534 n. 115 (1996) (“While it might seem unusual to override Title VII’s presumption
of legality, the result is mandated by RFRA.”). But see Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]here is a compelling interest in
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Second, the majority purported to limit only racial
discrimination “cloaked” as religious practice. 212 Many potential
RFRA claimants, including employers with white separatist views or
affiliations, do not “cloak” their discrimination as religious
practice. 213 Rather, their racist views are deeply tied to their
religious views, even mandated by them. 214 These potential
claimants would easily make out a prima facie case for a RFRA
claim, not because they are disguising their racism as religion, but
because their racism is a sincerely held religious belief. 215 As Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent demonstrates, such discriminatory claims have
been brought on the basis of religious belief numerous times and
are not merely a theoretical occurrence. 216
A court inquiring into what beliefs can be deemed religious is
exactly the Establishment Clause “minefield” that Justice Ginsburg
feared. 217 How a court would determine what beliefs are genuinely
religious and which are merely “cloaked” in religious practice, while
accepting RFRA’s mandate that it applies to all exercises of religion,
is a difficult question. But even if that question could be answered,
once it is found that a claimant holds a sincere, religious, and racist
belief, the majority’s dicta limiting only claims of racist beliefs
“cloaked” as religious practice would no longer apply. Unless the
Court wished to assert that discrimination against women or sexual
minorities was a legitimate and sincere exercise of religion, while
race discrimination was not, it would seem the Hobby Lobby

ensuring that Title VII remains enforceable as to employment relationships that do not
implicate concerns under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. . . . [T]he Title VII
framework is the least restrictive means of furthering this compelling interest.”).
212 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
213 DOBRATZ & SHANKS-MEILE, supra note 16, at 78–80.
214 Id. See also supra Part I.
215 See supra Part III.A.
216 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804–05. Justice Ginsburg cited, among others, the recent
case of Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), where a
photography company refused to photograph a same-sex wedding. Although her claim for
an exemption from New Mexico’s antidiscrimination laws failed, the religious nature of her
objection to homosexuality was not questioned or discussed. Willock, 309 P.3d at 60. The
Court seemed to accept at face value that it was religious. Justice Ginsburg also cited to
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 944 (D.S.C. 1966), where a business
owner alleged that he had a religious opposition to racial integration. Like so many cases
that address religious exemptions, the religious nature of his discriminatory belief was not
questioned. Id. at 945. For a comparison of religious accommodation of discrimination
against LGBT and racial minorities, see Nathan A. Berkeley, Religious Freedom and LGBT
Rights: Trading Zero Sum Approaches for Careful Distinctions and Genuine Pluralism, 50 GONZ.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
217 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2804–06 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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decision provided few logical barriers against race discrimination to
affirm the dicta of the opinion. 218
In the aftermath of the Hobby Lobby decision, a wide variety of
different organizations began to pursue RFRA exemptions. 219 Going
forward, the Court’s holdings may not be logically limited in ways
the majority asserted in dicta.
IV. PROPOSAL

The Constitution enshrines the right of American citizens to
practice their religion freely and to be governed by a Congress that
does not establish or prefer any single religion to another. 220
However, prior to RFRA’s enactment and the Hobby Lobby decision,
these rights were never presumed to be limitless. 221 Therefore,
ideally, RFRA should be repealed, and the law returned to the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence prior to the law’s
enactment. 222 Failing that, an amendment to the federal RFRA that
protects Title VII and, ideally, other civil rights laws, would be the
most effective way of preventing the potential consequences of the
Hobby Lobby ruling in employment discrimination. 223

218 Although that may be what the Court is asserting. There is some evidence to suggest
that the Supreme Court views religious objections to abortions as a “special case,” where
religious objections should receive even stronger protections. This is in part demonstrated
by its insistence that the Hobby Lobby case is applicable only to the contraception mandate,
despite the applicability of its reasoning in the opinion to many different religious
exemptions. Whether the Court will use this type of analysis in future cases, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note.
219 Michael Hiltzick, Danger Sign: the Supreme Court Has Already Expanded the Hobby
Lobby Decision, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-expanded-hobby-lobby-20140702-column.html#page=1; Dahlia Lithwick &
Sonja West, Quick Change Justice, SLATE (July 4, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/wheaton_college_injunction_the_
supreme_court_just_sneakily_reversed_itself.html. See also Welch v. Brown, 58 F. Supp. 3d
1079, 1087 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (analyzing a First Amendment claim for a religious
exemption to a California law banning sexual orientation change therapy for minors).
Interestingly enough, several religious organizations are pursuing exemptions from
abortion restrictions, citing their sincere belief in women’s autonomy. See, e.g., Press
Release, The Satanic Temple, Satanists Leverage Hobby Lobby Ruling in Support of Pro-Choice
Initiative (July 28, 2014), http://thesatanictemple.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
TSTPRWomensHealth-HobbyLobbyPressRelease.pdf; Irin Carmon, Satanists Aren’t the Only
Ones Following Hobby Lobby’s Lead, MSNBC (July 29, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/satanists-hobby-lobby-when-religious-exemptions-are-prochoice.
220 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
221 See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court:
the Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2010)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence prior to the passage of RFRA).
222 For a complete analysis of this proposal, see generally HAMILTON, supra note 71.
223 The Center for American Progress (CAP), a progressive organization, proposed an
amendment to the federal RFRA in the aftermath of the Hobby Lobby decision that would
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However, while these solutions would prevent many of the
undesirable consequences of RFRA, they are less practical. Such
solutions seem unlikely to succeed in a legislature that has
demonstrated its continuing commitment to providing broad
religious exemptions. 224 While it would be ideal for substantive
changes to be made to the federal RFRA in order to counteract the
potential negative effects of the Hobby Lobby ruling, it seems
unlikely that in the current political atmosphere, the federal
legislature is capable of providing such changes. 225
Instead, states should amend their own RFRAs to protect their
citizens from employment discrimination. Such amendments would
mandate that employment discrimination laws be immune from
challenges under the state RFRA. This would prevent courts from
granting exemptions to those laws under RFRA’s extreme standard
because most states have their own versions of Title VII prohibiting
race discrimination in employment. 226 Since the federal RFRA is no

restrict allowable religious exemptions under RFRA exclusively to those exemptions that do
not harm others. DONNA BARRY ET. AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A BLUEPRINT FOR RECLAIMING
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY POST-HOBBY LOBBY 14 (2014), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/ReligiousLibertyReport.pdf (proposing the following language
as an amendment to RFRA: “[t]his section [referring to the existing statute] does not
authorize exemptions that discriminate against, impose costs on, or otherwise harm others,
including those who may belong to other religions and/or adhere to other beliefs”).
224 Various federal legislators have expressed disapproval with the Hobby Lobby
decision; however, the objections and proposed amendments put forward by legislators
after the decision mainly addressed the contention that for-profit companies should not be
able to assert religious beliefs, not broad religious liberty specifically. For example, Senator
Charles Schumer suggested that the legislature should clarify that RFRA was not intended to
extend to for-profit corporations. Kevin Daley, After Hobby Lobby Ruling, Democrats Move to
Amend RFRA, WASH. EXAM’R (July 2, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
after-hobby-lobby-ruling-democrats-move-to-amend-rfra/article/2550444 (“RFRA ‘was
not intended to extend the same protection to for-profit corporations, whose very purpose
is to profit from the open market’ . . . .”). Senator Dick Durbin proposed a RFRA amendment
to that effect. Id. The White House also issued a statement after the ruling, explaining that
while a company should not be able to impose its beliefs on their employees, President
Obama wished to emphasize that he “believes strongly” in religious liberty. Press Briefing
by Josh Earnest, Press Sec’y, in Wash., D.C. (June 30, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/06/30/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-6302014.
225 The 113th Congress, which ended on January 3, 2015, was one of the least productive
in history, enacting only 296 laws. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics# (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). On
average, each Congress since 1973 (the 93rd Congress) has enacted approximately 551
laws. Id. However, even if the federal legislature was actively passing laws, it is unlikely that
amending RFRA would be a priority. Religious exemptions remain a contentious topic,
evoking strong opinions on either side of the debate from legislators and their constituents.
See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Ruling Ignites Debate Over
Religious-Freedom Law, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 3:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/supreme-courts-hobby-lobby-ruling-ignites-debate-over-religious-freedom-law1404155510.
226 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2014); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102
(West 2015); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West 2013).
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longer applicable to the states, businesses that want a religious
exemption to state antidiscrimination laws would have to bring a
challenge under the state RFRA. 227 But if amendments were
introduced into state RFRAs that blocked state antidiscrimination
employment laws from RFRA challenges, then state law would
protect citizens of these states, even if the employers received an
exemption from Title VII under the federal RFRA. 228
An ideal amendment to state RFRAs would be similar to the
language adopted in some states that removes certain laws from
RFRA’s scope. Pennsylvania, for instance, has incorporated a list of
statutes to which the protections of RFRA do not apply, such as
abuse reporting laws. 229 If similar language were incorporated into
state RFRAs, mandating that employment discrimination laws were
immune from RFRA challenges, a white separatist corporation
would not be able to receive an exemption to those laws. For
example, an amendment to the state RFRA could declare that
notwithstanding the substantive RFRA statute—stating that a law
may substantially burden religion only if it serves a compelling
interest and is the “least restrictive means”—the state RFRA will
not apply to state antidiscrimination employment statutes.
Incorporating this language into state RFRAs would prevent the
type of claims that allowed Hobby Lobby to skirt the contraceptive
mandate, but would still allow religious exemptions outlined in the
antidiscrimination statute. This strikes the ideal balance between
preventing widespread discrimination and allowing religious
organizations a measure of freedom granted to them by state
constitutions and antidiscrimination laws.
Because each state with a RFRA has adopted its own version,
amendments preventing employment discrimination would be
accomplished by each state individually. The general language of
the amendment, however, could be similar in each state regardless
of its individual RFRA, because it would only remove
antidiscrimination employment laws from challenges under the
state RFRA without changing the burden on any parties, or the
procedure for bringing claims.
One counterargument to this proposal is that a widespread
campaign to amend state RFRAs would be just as impractical as
227 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); HAMILTON, supra note 70, at 235–37
(detailing the implications of Boerne for religious exemptions).
228 Since businesses in states without RFRAs are bound by state antidiscrimination laws,
employees in these states are safe from RFRA exemptions to discriminatory employment
practices. Since the federal RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the states, there is no way
for businesses to bring a RFRA challenge to the antidiscrimination laws in these states.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
229 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2406(b) (West 2014).
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amending the federal law. However, the federal legislature has
demonstrated an inability to make progress on contentious
issues. 230 In contrast, some states have already demonstrated that
they are prepared to take legislative action to prevent the
undesirable consequences of RFRAs. 231 As discussed above, both
North Dakota and Colorado declined to pass their own state RFRAs
in 2012, 232 while Michigan prevented the passage of a RFRA in
2014. 233 The greatest public pushback against a state RFRA
occurred in Arizona, where Governor Jan Brewer vetoed an
amendment to the Arizona RFRA that would allow religious
claimants to assert RFRA as a defense in disputes between private
parties. 234
It is true that while some states are limiting their RFRAs, others
are pushing to expand them. 235 Furthermore, some states that
currently do not have RFRAs are considering proposed versions of
the law that provide even broader religious liberty than previously
contemplated by state and federal RFRAs. 236 These are indications
that some states may have a difficult time passing the suggested
amendments to their state RFRAs. But the recent pushbacks against
RFRAs in other states, especially in the wake of the Hobby Lobby
decision, is an encouraging sign that other state legislators and their
constituents are beginning to realize the widespread impact of
RFRAs and are willing to take legislative action to amend them.
Similarly, Michigan, a state that rejected passing a state RFRA,
recently implored Congress to pass pending legislation that would
prevent for-profit employers from denying women federally

See supra note 225.
See supra Part II.B.
HAMILTON, supra note 71, at 29.
See H.B. 5958, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014).
See S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014); Press conference by Jan Brewer,
Governor of Ariz., (Feb. 26, 2014), http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/brewer-1062prepared-remarks.pdf (discussing the veto of S.B. 1062). This amendment received
attention mainly because civil rights groups feared it would be used to deny service to LGBT
citizens. See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes
Controversial Anti-Gay Bill, SB 1062, CNN (Feb. 26, 2014, 11:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill. However, the amendment was not specific to
LGBT citizens and could be used to deny service to anyone based on discriminatory
religious beliefs. Thus, such an amendment could be used by a white separatist business
owner to deny service based on race as well. Governor Brewer’s veto is an encouraging sign
that the potential detriment to third-parties due to religious exemptions is gaining attention
from state citizens and legislatures.
235 See supra Part II.B.
236 Indiana and Georgia, for instance, have proposed RFRAs that would allow claims for
injunctive relief when a religious believer’s exercise of religion is merely “likely” to be
substantially burdened, and would allow the state RFRA to be asserted as a defense in a suit
between private parties. See H.B. 29, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014); S.B. 568,
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
230
231
232
233
234
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mandated contraceptive coverage. 237 While the potential dangers of
the Hobby Lobby ruling extend past employee healthcare, 238 such
legislation indicates that state citizens and legislatures support
statutes that prevent undesirable religious exemptions. It is also an
encouraging sign that states without RFRAs are willing to act to
protect their constituents from the federal RFRA. 239
In light of the potential consequences of the Hobby Lobby
decision, it is more important than ever that states take action to
protect their citizens from employment discrimination. To protect
their constituents from harmful religious exemptions, before the
courts grant them, states should adopt amendments to their RFRAs
that explicitly prohibit granting religious exemptions to
antidiscrimination employment laws.
CONCLUSION

The notion that any law should be subject to the whims of
particular religious believers is problematic. The rule of law cannot
continue in American society if religious claimants have the
capability to carve out particularized exemptions to any law they
disagree with. This is especially true in a field such as
discrimination, whether it is against women, the LGBT community,
or racial minorities. With widely varying beliefs as to the utility of
federal law in remedying discrimination, allowing religious
claimants exemptions at will to such laws would, in practice, render
them useless. However, after the passage of RFRA and its
subsequent interpretations, including Hobby Lobby, such religious
claims are indeed possible, to the detriment of all Americans. With
Congress in an ideological gridlock, legislators at the state level
should adopt amendments to their RFRAs to ensure that
unrestrained religious liberty does not encroach on the
employment rights of their constituents.

237 See H. Res. 400, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014) (urging Congress to pass The
Protect Women’s Health From Corporate Interference Act of 2014, S. 2578, 113th Cong.
(2014)).
238 See supra Part III.
239 While Michigan’s legislative efforts to undo the effects of the Hobby Lobby decision are
admirable, amendments to state RFRAs should ideally do more than simply target current
and popular religious exemptions. As discussed above, the federal RFRA and its state
counterparts allow for the possibility of many different religious exemptions that could
harm a state legislature’s constituents. See supra Part III.

